Recording Industry vs The People: Litigation Documents in Elektra v. Santangelo

Friday, September 02, 2005

Litigation Documents in Elektra v. Santangelo

The following are the litigation documents, in *.pdf format, for the defendant's motion to dismiss complaint in Elektra v. Santangelo:

Notice of Motion to dismiss complaint
(Alternate link)
Memorandum of Law in support of motion to dismiss complaint
(Alternate link)
Affidavit of Morlan Ty Rogers in support of motion to dismiss complaint
Exhibit A (Complaint)
Exhibit A of Complaint
Exhibit B of Complaint, first part
Exhibit B of Complaint, cont'd
Exhibit B of Complaint, cont'd)

Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in opposition to motion to dismiss complaint

Reply Memorandum of Law in support of motion to dismiss complaint
Revised Reply Memorandum of Law in support of motion to dismiss complaint

Letter of plaintiff's counsel requesting second oral argument and permission to submit additional papers

The motion has been fully briefed and argued, and the parties are awaiting the Court's decision.

8 comments:

LilBambi said...: Well stated case. Good luck. It's about time someone fought this instead of just buckling under them because it is expensive to oppose them. I have great respect for anyone who stands up for their rights when they are apparently in the right despite the odds and big money.; August 28, 2005 at 10:36:00 PM EDT
Anonymous said...: I would just like to say that I have a profound feeling of respect for your law firm. Protecting those who are at odds against big business and their bullying.; September 1, 2005 at 9:36:00 PM EDT
Anonymous said...: Well done, Mr. Beckerman. Generally, I have a rather low opinion of the legal profession: for the most part, I think lawyers and lawfirms work to generate more revenue, not to help their clients. The two aren't always mutually exclusive, but I think they often are.

In this case, however, it really looks as if you and your firm are trying to work in the best interest of the defendent. I would like to see the "terror" and bullying tactics of organizations like the RIAA and their associates revealed for what they are: unfair, unrealistic, and not supportive of the rights of both the copyright owner and the purchaser of usage rights.

Because contrary to what the RIAA and its friends think, when someone pays for music or video usage, they *do* have rights. I don't think the protections afforded to copyright holders in the laws as orignally drafted were ever intended force a consumer to pay seperately for every device upon which they (personally) partake of that media. And that's the way the copyright owners really want things to work: they want us to pay seperately when we listen to to a song on our computer, and again when we listen in our car, and again when we listen on our home stereo.

It may be "legal" for them to enforce particular copyrights in this fashion, but in many cases I am confident that they are stretching legal definitions to the breaking point to make it so.; September 1, 2005 at 9:56:00 PM EDT
Anonymous said...: I am just a layman curiously wondering: The plaintiff states, "[the] defendant...has used...an online media distribution system...to distribute Copyrighted Recordings to the public, and/or to make the Copyrighted Recordings[under (Exhibit A)] available for distribution to others. ...Defendent has violated Plaintiff's exclusive rights of reproduction and duplication." I do take for granted the absence of time and date's from this evidence of distribution invalidates it. But, why is this infringement stated not a "specific" infringement? I don't know if I am exposing my extreme ignorance of the law, but I was just wondering.
---; September 1, 2005 at 10:55:00 PM EDT
Izrath said...: Rob,

I'm not a scholar of law either, but I think it isn't "specific" because there is no specific "copying" or "distributing" of the material.

If they had recorded "x username from y ip address sent 14000kb of file1 in exhibit a to such and such ip address/username" then this would have been sufficient grounds to show "infringement"

Does that make sense?; September 2, 2005 at 1:08:00 AM EDT
Anonymous said...: And about bloody time too.; September 2, 2005 at 10:30:00 AM EDT
Anonymous said...: If they had recorded "x username from y ip address sent 14000kb of file1 in exhibit a to such and such ip address/username" then this would have been sufficient grounds to show "infringement"

I'd say that that is insufficient evidance to prove copyright infringment.

Give me ten mins with a computer and i can prove that the file distributed was mearly an alternate encoding of the bible.; September 5, 2005 at 8:19:00 PM EDT
Anonymous said...: I have a question. in none of those exhibits do I find where this person is actually downloading or having the file downloaded. What actual basis does the RIAA have for this case? The fact that you find titles like "Albumart_{string of numbers}" shows that this person had just shared where they extract their CD's to for personal use. The titles of the mp3's all appear to follow a pretty common default setting in Windows Media Player of artist_name_Song_title.mp3. This would lead me to believe that again these are all albums that the defendent owns or has owned in the past and had copied to their library. Correct me if I am wrong but does kazza as a default search your computer for media files to share? Does it not also set itself up to start up at computer bootup? So in all fairness could this computer have done this sharing without the defendants knowledge? There appear to be lots of holes in this case.; September 10, 2005 at 4:06:00 PM EDT

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JUDICIAL QUOTATIONS

"[T]he Court is concerned about the lack of facts establishing that Defendant was using that IP address at that particular time. Indeed, the [complaint] does not explain what link, if any, there is between Defendant and the IP address. It is possible that Plaintiff sued Defendant because he is the subscriber to IP address .... As recognized by many courts, just because an IP address is registered to an individual does not mean that he or she is guilty of infringement when that IP address is used to commit infringing activity." -Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz, Chief Judge, S.D. California. January 29, 2013, AF Holdings v. Rogers
"The complaints assert that the defendants – identified only by IP address – were the individuals who downloaded the subject “work” and participated in the BitTorrent swarm. However, the assumption that the person who pays for Internet access at a given location is the same individual who allegedly downloaded a single sexually explicit film is tenuous, and one that has grown more so over time." - Hon. Gary R. Brown, Magistrate Judge, E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012, K-Beech v. Does 1-37
"The concern of this Court is that in these lawsuits, potentially meritorious legal and factual defenses are not being litigated, and instead, the federal judiciary is being used as a hammer by a small group of plaintiffs to pound settlements out of unrepresented defendants."
-Hon. S. James Otero, Dist. Judge, Central Dist. California, March 2, 2007, Elektra v. O'Brien, 2007 ILRWeb (P&F) 1555
"The University has adequately demonstrated that it is not able to identify the alleged infringers with a reasonable degree of technical certainty...[C]ompliance with the subpoena as to the IP addresses represented by these Defendants would expose innocent parties to intrusive discovery....[T]he Court declines to authorize discovery and quashes the subpoena as to Does # 8, 9, and 14" -Hon. Nancy Gertner, Dist. Judge, Dist. Massachusetts, November 24, 2008, London-Sire Records v. Does 1-4
"[C]ounsel representing the record companies have an ethical obligation to fully understand that they are fighting people without lawyers... that the formalities of this are basically bankrupting people, and it's terribly critical that you stop it...." -Hon. Nancy Gertner, Dist. Judge, Dist. Massachusetts, June 17, 2008, London-Sire v. Does 1-4
"Rule 11(b)(3) requires that a representation in a pleading have evidentiary support and one wonders if the Plaintiffs are intentionally flouting that requirement in order to make their discovery efforts more convenient or to avoid paying the proper filing fees. In my view, the Court would be well within its power to direct the Plaintiffs to show cause why they have not violated Rule 11(b) with their allegations respecting joinder. [I]t is difficult to ignore the kind of gamesmanship that is going on here.....These plaintiffs have devised a clever scheme... to obtain court-authorized discovery prior to the service of complaints, but it troubles me that they do so with impunity and at the expense of the requirements of Rule 11(b)(3) because they have no good faith evidentiary basis to believe the cases should be joined." -Hon. Margaret J. Kravchuk, Magistrate Judge, District of Maine, January 25, 2008, Arista v. Does 1-27, 2008 WL 222283, modified Oct. 29, 2008
"[N]either the parties' submissions nor the Court's own research has revealed any case holding the mere owner of an internet account contributorily or vicariously liable for the infringing activities of third persons.....In addition to the weakness of the secondary copyright infringement claims against Ms. Foster, there is a question of the plaintiffs' motivations in pursuing them..... [T]here is an appearance that the plaintiffs initiated the secondary infringement claims to press Ms. Foster into settlement after they had ceased to believe she was a direct or "primary" infringer." -Hon. Lee R. West, District Judge, Western District of Oklahoma, February 6, 2007, Capitol v. Foster, 2007 WL 1028532
"[A]n overwhelming majority of cases brought by recording companies against individuals are resolved without so much as an appearance by the defendant, usually through default judgment or stipulated dismissal.....The Defendant Does cannot question the propriety of joinder if they do not set foot in the courthouse." -Hon. S. James Otero, Central District of California, August 29, 2007, SONY BMG v. Does 1-5, 2007 ILRWeb (P&F) 2535
"Plaintiffs are ordered to file any future cases of this nature against one defendant at a time, and may not join defendants for their convenience."
-Hon. Sam Sparks and Hon. Lee Yeakel, District Judges, Western District of Texas, November 17, 2004, Fonovisa v. Does 1-41, 2004 ILRWeb (P&F) 3053
"The Court is unaware of any other authority that authorizes the ex parte subpoena requested by plaintiffs."
-Hon. Walter D. Kelley, Jr., District Judge, Eastern District of Virginia, July 12, 2007, Interscope v. Does 1-7, 494 F. Supp. 2d 388, vacated on reconsideration 6/20/08
"Plaintiffs contend that unless the Court allows ex parte immediate discovery, they will be irreparably harmed. While the Court does not dispute that infringement of a copyright results in harm, it requires a Coleridgian "suspension of disbelief" to accept that the harm is irreparable, especially when monetary damages can cure any alleged violation. On the other hand, the harm related to disclosure of confidential information in a student or faculty member's Internet files can be equally harmful.....Moreover, ex parte proceedings should be the exception, not the rule."
-Hon. Lorenzo F. Garcia, Magistrate Judge, District of New Mexico, May 24, 2007, Capitol v. Does 1-16, 2007 WL 1893603
"'Statutory damages must still bear some relation to actual damages." Hon. Michael J. Davis, Dist. Judge, U.S.District Court, Dist. Minnesota, January 22, 2010, Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset
"[T]his court finds that defendants' use of the same ISP and P2P networks to allegedly commit copyright infringement is, without more, insufficient for permissive joinder under Rule 20. This court will sever not only the moving defendants from this action, but all other Doe defendants except Doe 2."
-Hon. W. Earl Britt, District Judge, Eastern District of North Carolina, February 27, 2008, LaFace v. Does 1-38, 2008 WL 544992
"[L]arge awards of statutory damages can raise due process concerns. Extending the reasoning of Gore and its progeny, a number of courts have recognized that an award of statutory damages may violate due process if the amount of the award is "out of all reasonable proportion" to the actual harm caused by a defendant's conduct.[T]hese cases are doubtlessly correct to note that a punitive and grossly excessive statutory damages award violates the Due Process Clause....."Hon. Marilyn Hall Patel, Dist. Judge, N.D. California, June 1, 2005, In re Napster, 2005 US DIST Lexis 11498, 2005 WL 1287611
"[P]laintiffs can cite to no case foreclosing the applicability of the due process clause to the aggregation of minimum statutory damages proscribed under the Copyright Act. On the other hand, Lindor cites to case law and to law review articles suggesting that, in a proper case, a court may extend its current due process jurisprudence prohibiting grossly excessive punitive jury awards to prohibit the award of statutory damages mandated under the Copyright Act if they are grossly in excess of the actual damages suffered....."-Hon. David G. Trager, Senior District Judge, Eastern Dist. New York, November 9, 2006, UMG v. Lindor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83486, 2006 WL 3335048
"'[S]tatutory damages should bear some relation to actual damages suffered'....(citations omitted) and 'cannot be divorced entirely from economic reality'". -Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin, Dist. Judge, Southern Dist. New York, August 19, 2008, Yurman v. Castaneda
"The Court would be remiss if it did not take this opportunity to implore Congress to amend the Copyright Act to address liability and damages in peer to peer network cases.... The defendant is an individual, a consumer. She is not a business. She sought no profit from her acts..... [T]he damages awarded in this case are wholly disproportionate to the damages suffered by Plaintiffs." -Hon. Michael J. Davis, District Judge, Dist. Minnesota, September 24, 2008, Capitol v. Thomas
"If there is an asymmetry in copyright, it is one that actually favors defendants. The successful assertion of a copyright confirms the plaintiff's possession of an exclusive, and sometimes very valuable, right, and thus gives it an incentive to spend heavily on litigation. In contrast, a successful defense against a copyright claim, when it throws the copyrighted work into the public domain, benefits all users of the public domain, not just the defendant; he obtains no exclusive right and so his incentive to spend on defense is reduced and he may be forced into an unfavorable settlement." US Court of Appeals, 7th Cir., July 9, 2008, Eagle Services Corp. v. H20 Industrial Services, Inc., 532 F.3d 620
"Customers who download music and movies for free would not necessarily spend money to acquire the same product.....RIAA’s request problematically assumes that every illegal download resulted in a lost sale."
-Hon. James P. Jones, Dist. Judge, Western Dist. Virginia, November 7, 2008, USA v. Dove