Recording Industry vs The People: Default Judgment against Michelle Santangelo vacated; RIAA seeks $513 in attorneys' fees

Thursday, July 19, 2007

Default Judgment against Michelle Santangelo vacated; RIAA seeks $513 in attorneys' fees

According to court papers filed by the RIAA in Elektra v. Santangelo II, the default judgment it had taken against Michelle Santangelo was vacated by the Court at the July 13th status conference. Recording Industry vs. The People has not yet seen an order embodying that ruling.

In the court papers, the RIAA seeks to be reimbursed for $513 in attorneys fees incurred in (a) procuring the default judgment, and (b) preparing for post-judgment enforcement.

The papers indicate that Richard L. Gabriel's hourly billing rate is $375.

Update:

Subsequent to the publication of this post, we obtained a copy of the Court's docket sheet entry recording the Court's vacatur of the default judgment.

July 18, 2007, Declaration of Richard L. Gabriel*
Minute entry for July 13, 2007, conference, vacating default judgment*

*Document published online at Internet Law & Regulation

Commentary & discussion:

p2pnet (July 13th story on vacatur of judgment)
p2pnet (July 19th story on Richard L. Gabriel attorneys fees)
Slashdot
E-Pressen

Keywords: digital copyright online law legal download upload peer to peer p2p file sharing filesharing music movies indie independent label freeculture creative commons pop/rock artists riaa independent mp3 cd favorite songs

7 comments:

Marc W. Bourgeois said...: It seems Mr. Gabriel commands quite a bit more than was ruled fair for Ms. Barringer-Thomson in Capitol v. Foster. It seems quite disingenuous to argue about someone's rates when you yourself charge over double.; July 19, 2007 at 9:19:00 AM EDT
Alter_Fritz said...: with all due respect but I'm wondering why a guy like "RIAA-Richard". that made numerous errors in previous filings and in other cases, a guy that needed to ask numerous times for extension of deadlines to answer stuff because he claimed he was so buisy to prepare the stuff and who is the Führeranwalt (lead counsel translation?) for the Labels of which Judge West said that those Counsels claimed stuff that was "not true";
why such a guy should be worth $375 per hour while counsel on the opposite side would only be worth $175 in case of Ms. Foster?!

And a simple paralegal for the "boilerplates"-using label counsel claims to be worth $150?
They must be either kidding or being very smart if they managed to get such fees from their clients the labels!

Santangelos shouldn't have to be liable for such IMO disapropriate fee demands.

(Serious question)
Isn't it the personal problem of the plaintiffs that they want to state under oath if defendant is a member of active military service? Why should defaulting defendant be responsible for costs plaintiffs have to ask some databases when plaintiffs for example simply could ask defendant itself if they want to state something under oath? (Serious question end)
It isn't that plaintiffs give such a damn about stating something under oath or penalty of perjury anyway, as it was found before that what they state in their papers is not true even if they do so under one of the beforementioned conditions!; July 19, 2007 at 10:19:00 AM EDT
Chris said...: How common is a motion like this? If I were defense counsel could I oppose the motion on grounds that I would be seeking fees and costs following the trial, settlement, or more likely, outright dismissal by the plaintiff when they realize they don't have a case?; July 20, 2007 at 10:36:00 AM EDT
raybeckerman said...: Schwammo said...

How common is a motion like this?

Like everything else the RIAA lawyers do, it's quite uncommon.; July 20, 2007 at 11:52:00 AM EDT
raybeckerman said...: Marc W. Bourgeois said...

It seems Mr. Gabriel commands quite a bit more than was ruled fair for Ms. Barringer-Thomson in Capitol v. Foster. It seems quite disingenuous to argue about someone's rates when you yourself charge over double.

The RIAA's lawyers disingenuous? How could you possibly think that?; July 21, 2007 at 12:05:00 AM EDT
raybeckerman said...: Alter_Fritz, I missed you. What were you, on vacation? If so, please check with me first next time. We can't just have you leave us in the lurch like that.; July 21, 2007 at 12:06:00 AM EDT
raybeckerman said...: It's a requirement, in getting a default judgment, to investigate and get an affidavit that the defendant is not in military service.

The real question is why did the RIAA get a default judgment in the first place, when Michelle was represented by counsel, and her counsel had entered into a discovery schedule on her behalf???; July 21, 2007 at 12:08:00 AM EDT

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JUDICIAL QUOTATIONS

"[T]he Court is concerned about the lack of facts establishing that Defendant was using that IP address at that particular time. Indeed, the [complaint] does not explain what link, if any, there is between Defendant and the IP address. It is possible that Plaintiff sued Defendant because he is the subscriber to IP address .... As recognized by many courts, just because an IP address is registered to an individual does not mean that he or she is guilty of infringement when that IP address is used to commit infringing activity." -Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz, Chief Judge, S.D. California. January 29, 2013, AF Holdings v. Rogers
"The complaints assert that the defendants – identified only by IP address – were the individuals who downloaded the subject “work” and participated in the BitTorrent swarm. However, the assumption that the person who pays for Internet access at a given location is the same individual who allegedly downloaded a single sexually explicit film is tenuous, and one that has grown more so over time." - Hon. Gary R. Brown, Magistrate Judge, E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012, K-Beech v. Does 1-37
"The concern of this Court is that in these lawsuits, potentially meritorious legal and factual defenses are not being litigated, and instead, the federal judiciary is being used as a hammer by a small group of plaintiffs to pound settlements out of unrepresented defendants."
-Hon. S. James Otero, Dist. Judge, Central Dist. California, March 2, 2007, Elektra v. O'Brien, 2007 ILRWeb (P&F) 1555
"The University has adequately demonstrated that it is not able to identify the alleged infringers with a reasonable degree of technical certainty...[C]ompliance with the subpoena as to the IP addresses represented by these Defendants would expose innocent parties to intrusive discovery....[T]he Court declines to authorize discovery and quashes the subpoena as to Does # 8, 9, and 14" -Hon. Nancy Gertner, Dist. Judge, Dist. Massachusetts, November 24, 2008, London-Sire Records v. Does 1-4
"[C]ounsel representing the record companies have an ethical obligation to fully understand that they are fighting people without lawyers... that the formalities of this are basically bankrupting people, and it's terribly critical that you stop it...." -Hon. Nancy Gertner, Dist. Judge, Dist. Massachusetts, June 17, 2008, London-Sire v. Does 1-4
"Rule 11(b)(3) requires that a representation in a pleading have evidentiary support and one wonders if the Plaintiffs are intentionally flouting that requirement in order to make their discovery efforts more convenient or to avoid paying the proper filing fees. In my view, the Court would be well within its power to direct the Plaintiffs to show cause why they have not violated Rule 11(b) with their allegations respecting joinder. [I]t is difficult to ignore the kind of gamesmanship that is going on here.....These plaintiffs have devised a clever scheme... to obtain court-authorized discovery prior to the service of complaints, but it troubles me that they do so with impunity and at the expense of the requirements of Rule 11(b)(3) because they have no good faith evidentiary basis to believe the cases should be joined." -Hon. Margaret J. Kravchuk, Magistrate Judge, District of Maine, January 25, 2008, Arista v. Does 1-27, 2008 WL 222283, modified Oct. 29, 2008
"[N]either the parties' submissions nor the Court's own research has revealed any case holding the mere owner of an internet account contributorily or vicariously liable for the infringing activities of third persons.....In addition to the weakness of the secondary copyright infringement claims against Ms. Foster, there is a question of the plaintiffs' motivations in pursuing them..... [T]here is an appearance that the plaintiffs initiated the secondary infringement claims to press Ms. Foster into settlement after they had ceased to believe she was a direct or "primary" infringer." -Hon. Lee R. West, District Judge, Western District of Oklahoma, February 6, 2007, Capitol v. Foster, 2007 WL 1028532
"[A]n overwhelming majority of cases brought by recording companies against individuals are resolved without so much as an appearance by the defendant, usually through default judgment or stipulated dismissal.....The Defendant Does cannot question the propriety of joinder if they do not set foot in the courthouse." -Hon. S. James Otero, Central District of California, August 29, 2007, SONY BMG v. Does 1-5, 2007 ILRWeb (P&F) 2535
"Plaintiffs are ordered to file any future cases of this nature against one defendant at a time, and may not join defendants for their convenience."
-Hon. Sam Sparks and Hon. Lee Yeakel, District Judges, Western District of Texas, November 17, 2004, Fonovisa v. Does 1-41, 2004 ILRWeb (P&F) 3053
"The Court is unaware of any other authority that authorizes the ex parte subpoena requested by plaintiffs."
-Hon. Walter D. Kelley, Jr., District Judge, Eastern District of Virginia, July 12, 2007, Interscope v. Does 1-7, 494 F. Supp. 2d 388, vacated on reconsideration 6/20/08
"Plaintiffs contend that unless the Court allows ex parte immediate discovery, they will be irreparably harmed. While the Court does not dispute that infringement of a copyright results in harm, it requires a Coleridgian "suspension of disbelief" to accept that the harm is irreparable, especially when monetary damages can cure any alleged violation. On the other hand, the harm related to disclosure of confidential information in a student or faculty member's Internet files can be equally harmful.....Moreover, ex parte proceedings should be the exception, not the rule."
-Hon. Lorenzo F. Garcia, Magistrate Judge, District of New Mexico, May 24, 2007, Capitol v. Does 1-16, 2007 WL 1893603
"'Statutory damages must still bear some relation to actual damages." Hon. Michael J. Davis, Dist. Judge, U.S.District Court, Dist. Minnesota, January 22, 2010, Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset
"[T]his court finds that defendants' use of the same ISP and P2P networks to allegedly commit copyright infringement is, without more, insufficient for permissive joinder under Rule 20. This court will sever not only the moving defendants from this action, but all other Doe defendants except Doe 2."
-Hon. W. Earl Britt, District Judge, Eastern District of North Carolina, February 27, 2008, LaFace v. Does 1-38, 2008 WL 544992
"[L]arge awards of statutory damages can raise due process concerns. Extending the reasoning of Gore and its progeny, a number of courts have recognized that an award of statutory damages may violate due process if the amount of the award is "out of all reasonable proportion" to the actual harm caused by a defendant's conduct.[T]hese cases are doubtlessly correct to note that a punitive and grossly excessive statutory damages award violates the Due Process Clause....."Hon. Marilyn Hall Patel, Dist. Judge, N.D. California, June 1, 2005, In re Napster, 2005 US DIST Lexis 11498, 2005 WL 1287611
"[P]laintiffs can cite to no case foreclosing the applicability of the due process clause to the aggregation of minimum statutory damages proscribed under the Copyright Act. On the other hand, Lindor cites to case law and to law review articles suggesting that, in a proper case, a court may extend its current due process jurisprudence prohibiting grossly excessive punitive jury awards to prohibit the award of statutory damages mandated under the Copyright Act if they are grossly in excess of the actual damages suffered....."-Hon. David G. Trager, Senior District Judge, Eastern Dist. New York, November 9, 2006, UMG v. Lindor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83486, 2006 WL 3335048
"'[S]tatutory damages should bear some relation to actual damages suffered'....(citations omitted) and 'cannot be divorced entirely from economic reality'". -Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin, Dist. Judge, Southern Dist. New York, August 19, 2008, Yurman v. Castaneda
"The Court would be remiss if it did not take this opportunity to implore Congress to amend the Copyright Act to address liability and damages in peer to peer network cases.... The defendant is an individual, a consumer. She is not a business. She sought no profit from her acts..... [T]he damages awarded in this case are wholly disproportionate to the damages suffered by Plaintiffs." -Hon. Michael J. Davis, District Judge, Dist. Minnesota, September 24, 2008, Capitol v. Thomas
"If there is an asymmetry in copyright, it is one that actually favors defendants. The successful assertion of a copyright confirms the plaintiff's possession of an exclusive, and sometimes very valuable, right, and thus gives it an incentive to spend heavily on litigation. In contrast, a successful defense against a copyright claim, when it throws the copyrighted work into the public domain, benefits all users of the public domain, not just the defendant; he obtains no exclusive right and so his incentive to spend on defense is reduced and he may be forced into an unfavorable settlement." US Court of Appeals, 7th Cir., July 9, 2008, Eagle Services Corp. v. H20 Industrial Services, Inc., 532 F.3d 620
"Customers who download music and movies for free would not necessarily spend money to acquire the same product.....RIAA’s request problematically assumes that every illegal download resulted in a lost sale."
-Hon. James P. Jones, Dist. Judge, Western Dist. Virginia, November 7, 2008, USA v. Dove