Recording Industry vs The People: Proposed expert testimony of John Perry Barlow excluded in SONY v Tenenbaum

Tuesday, June 30, 2009

Proposed expert testimony of John Perry Barlow excluded in SONY v Tenenbaum

The plaintiffs' motion to exclude the proposed expert testimony of former Grateful Dead lyricist John Perry Barlow has been granted, in SONY BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum. The court's order is as follows:

Judge Nancy Gertner: Electronic ORDER entered granting [855] Motion to Strike. "The Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Defendant's Expert John Perry Barlow [855] is GRANTED. The Defendant has indicated that no supplemental Expert Report will be forthcoming, therefore the Court considers the Amended Declaration presently before it (document # 855-2). This report indicates that Mr. Barlow proposes to testify on two main subjects relating to the "fairness of peer-to-peer file sharing in the context of the recording industry": (1) the impact of file sharing on the music industry's business model; and (2) how peer-to-peer technology furthers a fundamental human need to "share art." Id. at 2. Philosophical pronouncements like those in the latter category are not within the scope of expert testimony and the Court cannot give them the imprimatur of "expertise" at trial. Counsel for the Defendant analogized Barlow to the truck driver who offers expert testimony in an accident case on such things as the impact of a load shifting while driving. The analogy is misplaced: If Barlow were to testify about the creative process in which he has been engaged, that would be a matter of expertise drawn from experience. But he seeks to testify about market conditions, on the one hand, and philosophy and policy on the other. The truck driver who is an expert about trucking would not be permitted to testify, for example, about either existentialism or GM's bankruptcy. At most, the policy-judgments that Barlow intends to present may be better suited to testimony before Congress than testimony before a jury. If appropriate anywhere in the courtroom -- a question which the Court reserves -- these considerations belong in counsel's closing argument. With respect to the concrete impact of file sharing on the music industry, Barlow has not identified any data or publication that will support his views, nor does he describe in any depth the conclusions that he would draw from his "personal experiences in the music industry." Id. As a result, he has not provided the Plaintiffs with any basis on which they might examine him. Most notably, Barlow's four-page report fails to include "a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them," and "the data or other information considered by the witness in forming them." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B). It is not enough for Barlow to state that he will rely on his personal experience to testify broadly about a number of topics related to file sharing; an expert must actually disclose the testimony he intends to offer at trial, as completely as possible, and the specific foundation for his opinions. See Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 2008). The Rules of Civil Procedure require Barlow to offer those opinions in a manner that enables the opposing party to prepare adequately for trial. The Amended Declaration does not come close to that threshold, and therefore he is excluded as an expert pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1)." (Gaudet, Jennifer)

Keywords: lawyer digital copyright law online internet law legal download upload peer to peer p2p file sharing filesharing music movies indie independent label freeculture creative commons pop/rock artists riaa independent mp3 cd favorite songs intellectual property portable music player

3 comments:

Eric said...: Wha?

John Perry Barlow is not just a musician as the judge so crudely made analogy of, he is also the Vice Chairman of the EFF, associated with several electronic media groups, and gives lectures on topics that are at the heart of this conflict.

The Judge could have much easier just denied the motion for failure to be timely without the commentary.; June 30, 2009 at 3:19:00 PM EDT
T2 said...: As Ray has correctly pointed out before, this case is being litigated very oddly.

Tenenbaum's team is commendable in its intent to explain the "big picture", and address wider constitutional and philosophical implications --- regarding availability of court proceedings or copyright matters. Those have their place, but getting the procedural details right is also important; and when it comes to arguing minutiae, sticking to deadlines, and focusing on the detailed specifics of this case, I think Tenenbaum's team is not doing as good a job as they could/should.

Maybe if they can get appeals all the way to the Supreme Court, then their "big picture" arguments may find the right audience.; June 30, 2009 at 6:30:00 PM EDT
Jimmy Tie Dye said...: John Barlow probably got excluded because he'd try and tell the truth under oath. Peace from Tie Dyed Jim...; August 25, 2010 at 3:48:00 PM EDT

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JUDICIAL QUOTATIONS

"[T]he Court is concerned about the lack of facts establishing that Defendant was using that IP address at that particular time. Indeed, the [complaint] does not explain what link, if any, there is between Defendant and the IP address. It is possible that Plaintiff sued Defendant because he is the subscriber to IP address .... As recognized by many courts, just because an IP address is registered to an individual does not mean that he or she is guilty of infringement when that IP address is used to commit infringing activity." -Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz, Chief Judge, S.D. California. January 29, 2013, AF Holdings v. Rogers
"The complaints assert that the defendants – identified only by IP address – were the individuals who downloaded the subject “work” and participated in the BitTorrent swarm. However, the assumption that the person who pays for Internet access at a given location is the same individual who allegedly downloaded a single sexually explicit film is tenuous, and one that has grown more so over time." - Hon. Gary R. Brown, Magistrate Judge, E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012, K-Beech v. Does 1-37
"The concern of this Court is that in these lawsuits, potentially meritorious legal and factual defenses are not being litigated, and instead, the federal judiciary is being used as a hammer by a small group of plaintiffs to pound settlements out of unrepresented defendants."
-Hon. S. James Otero, Dist. Judge, Central Dist. California, March 2, 2007, Elektra v. O'Brien, 2007 ILRWeb (P&F) 1555
"The University has adequately demonstrated that it is not able to identify the alleged infringers with a reasonable degree of technical certainty...[C]ompliance with the subpoena as to the IP addresses represented by these Defendants would expose innocent parties to intrusive discovery....[T]he Court declines to authorize discovery and quashes the subpoena as to Does # 8, 9, and 14" -Hon. Nancy Gertner, Dist. Judge, Dist. Massachusetts, November 24, 2008, London-Sire Records v. Does 1-4
"[C]ounsel representing the record companies have an ethical obligation to fully understand that they are fighting people without lawyers... that the formalities of this are basically bankrupting people, and it's terribly critical that you stop it...." -Hon. Nancy Gertner, Dist. Judge, Dist. Massachusetts, June 17, 2008, London-Sire v. Does 1-4
"Rule 11(b)(3) requires that a representation in a pleading have evidentiary support and one wonders if the Plaintiffs are intentionally flouting that requirement in order to make their discovery efforts more convenient or to avoid paying the proper filing fees. In my view, the Court would be well within its power to direct the Plaintiffs to show cause why they have not violated Rule 11(b) with their allegations respecting joinder. [I]t is difficult to ignore the kind of gamesmanship that is going on here.....These plaintiffs have devised a clever scheme... to obtain court-authorized discovery prior to the service of complaints, but it troubles me that they do so with impunity and at the expense of the requirements of Rule 11(b)(3) because they have no good faith evidentiary basis to believe the cases should be joined." -Hon. Margaret J. Kravchuk, Magistrate Judge, District of Maine, January 25, 2008, Arista v. Does 1-27, 2008 WL 222283, modified Oct. 29, 2008
"[N]either the parties' submissions nor the Court's own research has revealed any case holding the mere owner of an internet account contributorily or vicariously liable for the infringing activities of third persons.....In addition to the weakness of the secondary copyright infringement claims against Ms. Foster, there is a question of the plaintiffs' motivations in pursuing them..... [T]here is an appearance that the plaintiffs initiated the secondary infringement claims to press Ms. Foster into settlement after they had ceased to believe she was a direct or "primary" infringer." -Hon. Lee R. West, District Judge, Western District of Oklahoma, February 6, 2007, Capitol v. Foster, 2007 WL 1028532
"[A]n overwhelming majority of cases brought by recording companies against individuals are resolved without so much as an appearance by the defendant, usually through default judgment or stipulated dismissal.....The Defendant Does cannot question the propriety of joinder if they do not set foot in the courthouse." -Hon. S. James Otero, Central District of California, August 29, 2007, SONY BMG v. Does 1-5, 2007 ILRWeb (P&F) 2535
"Plaintiffs are ordered to file any future cases of this nature against one defendant at a time, and may not join defendants for their convenience."
-Hon. Sam Sparks and Hon. Lee Yeakel, District Judges, Western District of Texas, November 17, 2004, Fonovisa v. Does 1-41, 2004 ILRWeb (P&F) 3053
"The Court is unaware of any other authority that authorizes the ex parte subpoena requested by plaintiffs."
-Hon. Walter D. Kelley, Jr., District Judge, Eastern District of Virginia, July 12, 2007, Interscope v. Does 1-7, 494 F. Supp. 2d 388, vacated on reconsideration 6/20/08
"Plaintiffs contend that unless the Court allows ex parte immediate discovery, they will be irreparably harmed. While the Court does not dispute that infringement of a copyright results in harm, it requires a Coleridgian "suspension of disbelief" to accept that the harm is irreparable, especially when monetary damages can cure any alleged violation. On the other hand, the harm related to disclosure of confidential information in a student or faculty member's Internet files can be equally harmful.....Moreover, ex parte proceedings should be the exception, not the rule."
-Hon. Lorenzo F. Garcia, Magistrate Judge, District of New Mexico, May 24, 2007, Capitol v. Does 1-16, 2007 WL 1893603
"'Statutory damages must still bear some relation to actual damages." Hon. Michael J. Davis, Dist. Judge, U.S.District Court, Dist. Minnesota, January 22, 2010, Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset
"[T]his court finds that defendants' use of the same ISP and P2P networks to allegedly commit copyright infringement is, without more, insufficient for permissive joinder under Rule 20. This court will sever not only the moving defendants from this action, but all other Doe defendants except Doe 2."
-Hon. W. Earl Britt, District Judge, Eastern District of North Carolina, February 27, 2008, LaFace v. Does 1-38, 2008 WL 544992
"[L]arge awards of statutory damages can raise due process concerns. Extending the reasoning of Gore and its progeny, a number of courts have recognized that an award of statutory damages may violate due process if the amount of the award is "out of all reasonable proportion" to the actual harm caused by a defendant's conduct.[T]hese cases are doubtlessly correct to note that a punitive and grossly excessive statutory damages award violates the Due Process Clause....."Hon. Marilyn Hall Patel, Dist. Judge, N.D. California, June 1, 2005, In re Napster, 2005 US DIST Lexis 11498, 2005 WL 1287611
"[P]laintiffs can cite to no case foreclosing the applicability of the due process clause to the aggregation of minimum statutory damages proscribed under the Copyright Act. On the other hand, Lindor cites to case law and to law review articles suggesting that, in a proper case, a court may extend its current due process jurisprudence prohibiting grossly excessive punitive jury awards to prohibit the award of statutory damages mandated under the Copyright Act if they are grossly in excess of the actual damages suffered....."-Hon. David G. Trager, Senior District Judge, Eastern Dist. New York, November 9, 2006, UMG v. Lindor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83486, 2006 WL 3335048
"'[S]tatutory damages should bear some relation to actual damages suffered'....(citations omitted) and 'cannot be divorced entirely from economic reality'". -Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin, Dist. Judge, Southern Dist. New York, August 19, 2008, Yurman v. Castaneda
"The Court would be remiss if it did not take this opportunity to implore Congress to amend the Copyright Act to address liability and damages in peer to peer network cases.... The defendant is an individual, a consumer. She is not a business. She sought no profit from her acts..... [T]he damages awarded in this case are wholly disproportionate to the damages suffered by Plaintiffs." -Hon. Michael J. Davis, District Judge, Dist. Minnesota, September 24, 2008, Capitol v. Thomas
"If there is an asymmetry in copyright, it is one that actually favors defendants. The successful assertion of a copyright confirms the plaintiff's possession of an exclusive, and sometimes very valuable, right, and thus gives it an incentive to spend heavily on litigation. In contrast, a successful defense against a copyright claim, when it throws the copyrighted work into the public domain, benefits all users of the public domain, not just the defendant; he obtains no exclusive right and so his incentive to spend on defense is reduced and he may be forced into an unfavorable settlement." US Court of Appeals, 7th Cir., July 9, 2008, Eagle Services Corp. v. H20 Industrial Services, Inc., 532 F.3d 620
"Customers who download music and movies for free would not necessarily spend money to acquire the same product.....RIAA’s request problematically assumes that every illegal download resulted in a lost sale."
-Hon. James P. Jones, Dist. Judge, Western Dist. Virginia, November 7, 2008, USA v. Dove